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Abstract 
The article seeks an answer to one of the most puzzling aspects of the century-long, engaged debate on citizenship  
(m ṭana) in Egypt i cope Ho did ci i en hip come o be confined o issues of religious (in)equality, thus 
preventing any form of meaningful engagement with other aspects of citizenship, be it political participation, gender 
equality, or class mobility? 
The article applies the Gramscian conceptual toolkit to shed some light on he limi ed cope of he di co e on ci i
en hip in Eg p b anal ing ho he hegemonic con en on ha ci i en hip means was built.  It identifies 
and characterizes three main phases in the debate, with an eye always on the scope. In its first phase (the counter-
hegemonic inception), traditional intellectuals challenged the post-colonial nationalist project of the ruling class and 
its organic intellectuals; in its second phase (the accommodation), traditional intellectuals explored ways to find mid-
ground solutions with organic intellectuals; and in its third phase (the counter-challenge), organic intellectuals were 
mobilized by an emerging sector of the ruling class against traditional intellectuals and their accommodation at-
tempts. In the buildup of the hegemonic consensus, however, the main accomplishment was eminently to occupy the 
space of the public debate with questions of religious (in)equality. 
A large, closing section is then dedicated to the analysis of a recent contribution by a prominent traditional intellectual 
(Ṭ i al-Bi h ha ho ho a g men a e con c ed o a o p o ide a con aining f ame ork of reference 
for the debate, and at the same time ground the hegemonic consensus in Islamicate discourse. 
 
*  Gianluca P. Parolin, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Law at the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations at the Aga 
Khan University, London. 
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Why does citizenship in Egypt evoke only images of religious in equality Why not questions
of political participation, or of gender equality, or of class mobility?  This article argues that the 
citizenship debate is one of the prime examples of how cultural hegemony has been constructed 
in Egypt in the past one hundred years, and how it has served to keep to the margins some of its 
undesired components. 
The Gramscian lens of hegemony focusing on the non-coercive forms of domination of the rul-
ing class allows us to understand two key phenomena in the Egyptian citizenship debate: the 
construction of a hegemonic consensus around what citizenship means, and also as a result
the marginalization of all other counter-hegemonic discourses on citizenship focusing on class, 
or gender, or participation in decision making. The hegemonic discourse on citizenship gener-
ated a common sense that citizenship can only mean irrelevance of religious affiliation in certain 
areas of the legal system. 
I will mainly engage with the first prong of the argument, which can also be articulated in the 
reverse: the contention between traditional and organic intellectuals is only apparent. In the case 
of Egypt organic intellectuals are the ones upon which the ruling class that emerged with the
creation of modern Egypt in the first half of the 1 th century relied to build consensus for the
new order Traditional intellectuals on the other hand are networks of intellectuals not en
gaged with the ruling class and its project, and who ground their authority in tradition When 
it comes to citizenship, both groups resort to Islamicate ideas and discourses, but traditional
intellectuals tend to refer to it as their main frame of reference  
In order to analyze the construction of the hegemonic discourse on citizenship, I will follow the 
trajectory of traditional intellectuals from counter-hegemonic stances to open conciliation with 
organic intellectuals.  I will then consider a recent contribution of a prominent traditional intel-
lectual (Ṭāriq al-Bishrī to show how the two apparently irreconcilable discourses might be
harmonized. 
II. The Citizenship Debate in Egypt: Three Phases and an 
Overarching Hegemonic Discourse 
The citizenship debate in Egypt can be described as a long war of position between organic and 
traditional intellectuals, but taking a step away from the confrontation one can easily see both 
parties engaged in the construction of a hegemonic discourse on citizenship that aimed at occu-
pying the public space and preventing any other discussion of citizenship themes beyond reli-
gious (in)equality. Focusing on the war of position, one can identify three main phases of the 
debate that illuminate the dynamics behind the building of the hegemonic consensus (this latter 
consensus should be kept as the fil rouge of the former debate, and will be fully detailed in the 
following subsections): in the first phase which I call the counter-hegemonic inception tradi
tional intellectuals brought a challenge against the post-colonial, nationalist project of the ruling 
class and its organic intellectuals we do not accept any form of political affiliation beyond or
below Islam In the second phase the accommodation traditional intellectuals explored ar
eas of accommodation with organic intellectuals we can work within a modern state as long
as it operates Islamically Finally in the third phase which I call the counter-challenge the
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regime massively mobilized its organic intellectuals and brought a counterchallenge against the 
traditional intellectuals if you want to work within a modern state then you need to accept its
our rules  
The most striking hegemonic element of the discourse is its scope; citizenship in Egypt is almost 
exclusively referred to as a shorthand for religious (in)equality. And what is even more striking 
is that, historically, the major breakthroughs for religious equality like the abolition of the jizya 
or the conscription of non-Muslims in the army had happened in the mid-1850s, long before 
the debate was started. Articulating a position on these breakthroughs by traditional intellectuals 
will be a main feature of the accommodation phase, and internal discussions among traditional 
intellectuals will surface in the account of that phase. 
1. The First Phase: The Counter-Hegemonic Inception 
In the first phase, from the late 1920s to the early 1950s, the main concern of organic intellectu-
als epitomized in the thought of Aḥmad Lu fī al-Sayyid (1872-1963) or Salāma Mūsá 1 -
1958) was the definition of new political communities in national terms waṭan),1 using na-
tionalism (waṭaniyya) as their ideological underpinning, and citizenship (muw ṭana) as the cen-
terpiece of their engineered loyalty. The relationship between the new regimes and their organic 
intellectuals with colonialism was at best problematic.2 In contexts like Egypt, the organic intel-
lectuals had to engage with the colonial nature of the new nation whereas in contexts like India
at stake was the de-colonization project. 
Traditional intellectuals, opposed to the nationalist project, initially articulated a counter-hege-
monic discourse that targeted the definition of the political community in national terms.  Citi-
zenship was criticized just as a form of engineered loyalty to the new entity, and traditional 
intellectuals believed that the participation of non-Muslims was the most compelling evidence 
of the project s wanting foundations. 
Opposition to (local) nationalism was chiefly expressed in Egypt by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949), 
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Because of his opposition to the nationalist project, al-
Bannā strongly denounced the attempts to define the political community through the establish-
ment of bonds of a lesser degree than Islam - i.e. bonds that he described as belonging to the Age 
of Ignorance (al-J hili a). Only Islam could serve as a proper political connector in his view. 
Arabness played a role in Islam and al-Bannā did not challenge such a role but openly stated
that Arabness just like local and other lesser connections could not serve as the political con
nector: The Muslim Brothers he wrote do not believe in nationalism qawmiyya) [...] and do 
not call [the nation] Pharaonic, Arab, Phoenician, Syrian, or any of the other expressions used by 
people, but believe in what the Prophet (ṢAAS) said: There is no preference for an Arab over a 
non-Arab, except on grounds of piety. 3 
 
1  In order to render the semantics in Arabic, the sequence in English should be: nation, nationalism, nationality. 
2  Ansari points out that traditional intellectuals did not object to the immediate political objectives of nationalism, such as 
liberation from foreign control and dominance.  See ANSARI ZAFAR, Contemporary Islam and Nationalism: A Case Study 
of Egypt, Die Welt des Islams 7.1 (1961), at 36 38. 
3  AL-BANNĀ ḤASAN, Majm ʿat Ras ʾil al-Im m al-Shah d Ḥasan al-Bann , Beirut 1992, at 21. 
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Responding to accusations of disloyalty by organic intellectuals, al-Bannā s arguments showed
some ambivalence and lost some of their counter-hegemonic strength when tinkering with dif-
ferent definitions of community.  On the horizon of organic intellectuals were the local political 
community (waṭan) and a broader Arab political community (qawm), whereas on the horizon of 
counter-hegemonic traditional intellectuals was only the Islamic political community (umma).  
Waṭan, qawm and umma were used in a variety of different connotations, hinting to the stark 
competition over both a the definition of community but also over b the political capital of
the terms (in either traditional or contemporary thought). 
Al-Bannā s chief compromise was with the local political community (waṭan), when he declared 
that Muslims are the most loyal and devoted to their homelands (awṭ n, plur. of waṭan), but that 
the foundation of their patriotism (waṭaniyya) is the Islamic faith (al-ʿaq da al-isl mi a Al-
Bannā s argument compromised with the local dimension of the community (waṭan) and its form 
of allegiance (waṭaniyya), while trying to square the circle by keeping the reference to Islam as 
the only proper political connector. 
Islam as the only proper political connector for al-Bannā thus meant that his Muslim Brothers
do not call for ethnic discrimination among classes in the community (al-umma) because [they] 
believe that Islam affords the widest protection by upholding the broadest human connector 
( biṭa) among humans, and recommends benevolence (al-birr wa-l-iḥs n) among citizens regard-
less of ideological or religious differences Beyond that however al-Bannā wrote we do not 
buy that unity with our faith (im n), nor bargain for it with our belief (ʿaq da), and do not forfeit 
for it the interests of Muslims (maṣ liḥ), but we rather buy it with truth, fairness and justice (al-
ḥaqq wa-l-inṣ f wa-l-ʿad la alone 4 
Al-Bannā s arguments resonated well beyond Egypt, and heavily influenced a prominent figure 
of political Islam working in India (and later independent Pakistan): Abū l-Aʿlá Mawdūdī (1903-
1979).5 Mawdūdī further articulated al-Bannā s compromise by positing that the only acceptable 
form of state for traditional intellectuals was a state whose belief or ideology was Islam. 
Mawdūdī developed his views in the context of pre-independence fears of either Muslims being 
absorbed in a Hindu-dominated state, or establishing their own state infused with nationalist 
ideas.  He thus posited Islam as the only acceptable political connector, and opposed the creation 
of an independent state in Pakistan (in which the majority of the population would be Muslim, 
but the state would have to be built around a larger nation, with a nationalist ideology, and a 
citizenship connector When that happened however in 1 4 he and his Jamāʿat-e-Islāmī
pledged allegiance to the new state, but only after Pakistan was declared an Islamic state (thus 
ushering in a new compromising approach). 
The declaration of the state as Islamic squared the circle for Mawdūdī What to do with the non-
Muslims of Pakistan, then? Mawdūdī wrote that residents of the Islamic state a state qualified 
as ideological (ʿaq ʾid ) are to be distinguished between those who believe in it (Muslims), and 
 
4  AL-BANNĀ, supra n. 3, at 88 89. 
5  The thought ofMawdūdī and al-Bannā the two founders or trailblazers of political Islam (ESPOSITO/SHAHEEN, The Oxford 
Handbook of Islam and Politics heavily influences later generations of traditional intellectuals from the revolutionary ide
ologues like Sayyid Qu b (1906-1966), to intellectuals  like al-Qaraḍāwī (1926-) or al-Ghannūshī (1941-)), as will appear 
from the resurfacing of concepts, concerns and expressions employed by them. AL-GHANNŪSHĪ RĀSHID, Ḥuq q al-
Muw ṭanah: Waḍ iyyat Ghayr al-Muslim f l-Mujtamaʿ al-Isl m , Tunis 1989. 
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those who do not (non-Muslims). Because of its ideological underpinnings, the Islamic state
which has to uphold the arrangements with non-Muslims as laid out in classical fiqh (like their 
basic protection and jurisdictional autonomy)6 cannot allow non-Muslims to have any impact 
on its decision-making including, for instance, participating in the election of Muslim represent-
atives.7 Mawdūdī conceded however on a separate representative body for non-Muslims.8 
Because of the close ideological positions of two traditional intellectuals like al-Bannā and
Mawdūdī the comparison between their approaches and their reactions to the political devel
opments in Pakistan and Egypt is even more illuminating. Citizenship (muw ṭana) was not per 
se the target of traditional intellectuals in the first phase; the political community defined in na-
tional terms (waṭan) was.  Even in this first phase, however, signs of a shift from a counter-heg-
emonic discourse challenging the new states to positions that could accommodate these new 
states can be detected.  This leads us to the next phase, where disagreement over the accommo-
dation created a rift among traditional intellectuals. 
2. The Second Phase: Hegemonic Accommodation 
The second phase is characterized by a change in strategy, which eventually led to a split among 
traditional intellectuals. As it will be detailed in this subsection, the majority opted for an accom-
modation over the legitimate foundation of the political community, while some pursued the 
line of confrontation on this latter point, but both camps drew on arguments elaborated in the 
earlier phase to build their case. An essential part of the accommodation for the participation of 
traditional intellectuals in institutional politics was to set conditions over issues of religious 
(in)equality. 
At the root of the accommodation was the last shift in al-Bannā s thought which was pursued
by the largest number of traditional intellectuals who followed in his footsteps, and elements of 
the accommodation can be seen both in the discourse on regional (Arab) and local (Egyptian) 
nationalism. 
Towards regional (Arab) nationalism (qawmiyya) which was the chief ideological trend until 
the mid-1960s traditional intellectuals fluctuated from indifference to appreciation.9 An exam-
ple of indifference can be detected in the commentary of  Muḥammad al-Ghazālī 1 1 -1996), an 
influential and divisive revivalist.  Whilst denouncing nationalism as a foreign plot to undo the 
unity of Muslims, al-Ghazālī asserted that as long as Islam could live by the side of Arab na
tionalist rule (f kanaf al-ḥukm al-qawm ), it was fine.  In particular, he did not see any problem (l
j n ḥ) in (Arab) nationalist rule as long as it enabled the Islamic system (al-niẓ m al-isl m ) to 
flourish under it (an yaʿ sh f  ẓil lih). 10 Al-Ghazālī thus seemed to be content with an al-Bannā-
styled coexistence without requiring a Mawdūdī-styled Islamic frame of reference. 
 
6  Article originally published in Ta j m n al-Qurʾ n in August 1948. Translated by Khurshīd Aḥmad and published in 
MAWDŪDĪ ABŪ YAʿLÁ, Islamic Law and Constitution, 2nd ed., Lahore 1960, 273 299.  
7  Article originally published in 1955. MAWDŪDĪ, supra n. 6, 300 311. 
8  Supra n. 6, at 296. 
9  The organic intellectuals attempts to bridge the divide between Arab nationalism and political Islam and extend a hand
to traditional intellectuals are not the focus of this chapter, but are explored in HAIM SYLVIA, Islam and the Theory of Arab 
Nationalism, Die Welt des Islams 4.2 (1955), 124 149. 
10  AL-GHAZĀLĪ MUḤAMMAD, Ḥaq a al-Qawmiyya al-ʿArabiyya wa-Usṭ rat al-Baʿth al-ʿArab , Cairo 1977, 8 23, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, 
al-M lim n a-l-A b ṭ, at 814. 
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An example of appreciation for Arab nationalism can be detected in the words of Yūsuf al-
Qaraḍāwī (1926-), chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and member of al-
Azhar s Body of Senior Scholars Whilst sharing al-Bannā s view on (local) nationalism which 
he defined as a J hil  approach nuzuʿ t j hiliyya) and declared it a form of shirk (polytheism), 
as new idols are associated to God a h n jad da maʿa all h)11 al-Qaraḍāwī nevertheless saw 
in the Arab nationalist project of bringing together the Arab peoples (al-shuʿ b al-ʿarabiyya) a first 
step to further bringing together all Muslims.  In order to sustain the qawmiyya exception to his 
anti-nationalist position, al-Qaraḍāwī had to resort to the ample literature in Islam s texts and 
traditions that upholds a certain primacy for Arabs, and went so far as to declare the connection 
between Islam and Arabness as organic i ib ṭ ʿuḍuw ).12 
With the demise of regional (Arab) nationalism (soon followed by the demise of state socialism), 
intellectuals (both organic and traditional) focused on the local (Egyptian) articulation of nation-
alism.  The accommodation manifested itself in this stage as acquiescence to the hegemonic dis-
course on Egypt as the political community whose citizens were the ones permanently resid-
ing within its geographical boundaries before WW1.13 Issues of definition of the political com-
munity thus receded to the background, while intellectuals debated the content of membership. 
In this stage the hegemonic discourse manifested itself in the participation of organic and tradi-
tional intellectuals alike in occupying the space of the debate on citizenship with issues of reli-
gious (in)equality.14 This concern with religious (in)equality is rather surprising, because no mo-
mentous or symbolic change had happened in that domain since the abolition of the jizya (the 
poll tax levied on non-Muslims) or the conscription of non-Muslims in the army in the mid-
1850s, more than a century earlier.15 
In this operation, traditional intellectuals engaged with the concept of status of protection for 
non-Muslims (dhimma), and the widest theoretical divide among them seemed to be on the per-
sistence and bearing of such a status, because they in turn tended to agree on the operational 
rules. At one end of the theoretical continuum (almost on the verge of a counter-hegemonic dis-
course), Qu b and al-Qaraḍāwī posited the persistence of the status of protection.  At the other 
end of the continuum (more in line with organic intellectuals), scholars like ʿUthmān, al-ʿAwwā, 
and Huwaydī challenged such a position. 
In traditional fiqh, the dhimma was the status of protection that some non-Muslims could contract 
with the imam. The only non-Muslims who could enter such an agreement were the ones collec-
 
11  AL-QARAḌĀWĪ YŪSUF, Ḥatmiyyat al-Ḥall al-Isl m , Vol. 1., al-Ḥul l al-Mustawrada wa-Kayfa Janat ʿalá Umma in , Cairo 1977, at 
54. The author also attributes to nationalism s the fall of the Islamic fortress the Caliphate wa-saqaṭat al-qalʿa al-
isl mi a al-Khil fa ibid at 55. 
12  AL-QARAḌĀWĪ YŪSUF, Ḥatmiyyat al-Ḥall al-Isl m , Vol. 2, at 29, but also, Vol.1, supra n. 11, at 143. The author in the first 
volume discusses Arab nationalism in the section on the Socialist Revolutionary solution (al-ishtir k al- ha ). 
13  See Law 26/1975 on Egyptian citizenship and all previous legislation. 
14  Coptic intellectuals and the Coptic Church itself actively participated in the debate, but I am focusing here on the perspec-
tive of traditional intellectuals. See ʿABD ALLĀH ISMĀʿĪL Ṣ./QILĀDA WILLIAM S./AL-ʿAWWĀ MUḤAMMAD S. (eds.), al-
Muw ṭana, Madīnat Naṣr 1998. 
15  Even then, in the 1850s, these breakthroughs in religious equality were an integral part of the Ottoman reform plan to 
establish a fuller control by the Sultan over his subjects, and command their loyalty especially at the Empire level. From 
the Kha -i Sharīf of 1839, and the Kha -i Humāyūn of 1856 all the way to the Ottoman Citizenship Law of 1869, the path 
of reforms pursued this goal over the Sultan s subjects including identifying who they were away from the protection
schemes of foreign powers which, incidentally, explains the prohibition of dual citizenship in the law. 
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tively identified as the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kit b), a definition that conventionally encom-
passed Majūs Zoroastrians Naṣārá (Christians), Ṣābiʾūn (Sabians),16 and Yahūd Jews  Sayyid 
Qu b (1906-1966), the revolutionary ideologue of political Islam,17 did not question the perma-
nence of the dhimma.  He considered the dhimma to be the source of an obligation of good treat-
ment of the protected non-Muslims, but not of loyalty towards them (ḥusn al-muʿ mala d n al-
muw l h).18 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī theorized the continuity of the contract of protection (ʿaqd al-
dhimma) from which rights and obligations descend.  Among these rights, al-Qaraḍāwī identified 
a general right to protection from foreign enemies and domestic injustice, including the protec-
tion of life, physical integrity, property, and honor,19 social welfare, the free exercise of religion 
(ḥurriyyat al-tadayyun), and the freedom to engage in work and other economic activities.  Among 
the obligations, al-Qaraḍāwī included the payment of jizya (the poll tax levied on non-Muslims), 
Kha j (the land tax levied on non-Muslims) and the commercial tax, along with the observance 
of Islamic regulations of civil transactions and respect of the rites and sentiments of Muslims.20 
The idea of the dhimma as an (obsolete) historical qualification was put forward as early as 1960 
by Muḥammad Fatḥī ʿ Uthmān (1928-2010), a modest, unassuming and tireless mujaddid, reviver 
and reformer of Islam 21 ʿUthmān stressed the necessity of transcending the old categories and 
qualifications encapsulated in the term dhimma and accepting non-Muslims as citizens with full 
rights.22 Elaborating on the justifications for such a transition from dhimma to citizenship, 
Muḥammad Salīm al-ʿAwwā (1942-), former Secretary General of the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars, argued that the contract of protection was terminated by the extinction of two 
parties under colonialism: the Islamic state and the non-Muslims living in the conquered lands.23 
For al-ʿAwwā, the participation of non-Muslims alongside Muslims in the struggle for liberation 
from colonialism established new states on new grounds: states were no longer functioning be-
cause of the legitimacy of the Conquest (sharʿiyyat al-fatḥ), but rather that of Liberation (sharʿiyyat 
al-taḥr r).24 In a further challenge to the Islamicity of the dhimma as historically practiced and 
legally codified in traditional fiqh, Fahmī Huwaydī 1 3 -), one of the most eminent Islamist po-
litical analysts, underlined in his celebrated work, Muw ṭin n l Dhimmi n, how the dhimma 
from a positive connotation was transformed by evil practices contrary to the spirit of Islam into 
an instrument to degrade and humiliate 25 
On a more practical level, when confronted with the issue of the applicability of the jizya the 
poll tax levied on dhimm s, and widely considered as the main marker of the dhimma traditional 
intellectuals tended to subscribe to the connection between the jizya and military service, regard-
less of their different theoretical assessments on the persistence of the dhimma. If the rationale for 
 
16  On the problematic identification of the Sabians, see the two entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Ṣābiʾ  
and Ṣābiʾa.   
17  AL-BANNĀ, supra n. 3. 
18  QUṬB SAYYID, Naḥw Mujtamaʿ Isl m , 9th ed., Cairo 1993, at 65. 
19  Clearly reminiscent of abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī s five maq ṣid in the ḍar riyy t category with the obvious absence of religion 
(d n). 
20  Ad ʾ al-jizya wa-l-khar j wa-l-ḍar ba al-tij i a a-il i m aḥk m al- n n al-i l m f l-muʿ mal t al-madaniyya wa-naḥwih , 
wa-ʾ kh ran iḥtir m haʿ ʾir al-muslim n wa-ma h ʿ rihim. AL-QARAḌĀWĪ YŪSUF, Ghayr al-M lim n f l-Mujtamaʿ al-Isl m , 
Cairo 1977, at 21. 
21  These are the words used by Esposito in the foreword to ʿUthmān s biography. OSMAN GHADA, A Journey in Islamic 
Thought. The Life of Fathi Osman, London/New York 2011, at xiv. 
22  FATḤĪ ʿUTHMĀN MUḤAMMAD, al-Fikr al-I l m a-l-Taṭawwur, Cairo 1960. 
23  AL-ʿAWWĀ MUḤAMMAD SALĪM, al-Fiqh al-I l m f Ṭar q al-Tajd d, Beirut 1998, at 74 75. 
24  Supra n. 23, at 62. 
25  Sab l[an] ilá al-in i ṣ wa-l-mah na. HUWAYDĪ FAHMĪ, Muw ṭin n l Dhimmi n, Cairo 1985, at 125. 
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the jizya was the non-service of dhimm s in the army, then their full conscription in the mid-1800s 
marked the end of the jizya.26 The position was embraced both by authors that affirm the conti-
nuity of the dhimma like al-Qaraḍāwī,27 and those who affirm its termination like al-ʿAwwā.28 A 
significant exception was Qu b, who conceived of the jizya as an expression of the principle of 
equality.  For Qu b, non-Muslims were called to contribute to the treasury just like Muslims were 
with the zakah In his overview Shāhīn concludes that there is consensus ijm ʿ) on the termi-
nation of the jizya either as a form of acceptance of reality or on the basis of the disappearance of 
the historical context of the conquest or in consideration of the partaking of non-Muslims in the 
defense of the homeland (waṭan).29 
On the same practical level, when it comes to the access of non-Muslims to public posts, tradi-
tional intellectuals tended to differentiate between ordinary state posts, open to everyone, and 
other positions, open only to Muslims.  These other positions were variously defined in schol-
arship.  Al-Qaraḍāwī and al-ʿAwwā, for instance, recognized the exclusion of non-Muslims from 
positions with a religious connotation  (ṣabgha d ni a In the positions with a religious conno
tation al-Qaraḍāwī included the presidency, army leadership, adjudication among Muslims, 
and collection of zakāh,30 while al-ʿAwwā did not mention adjudication at all, and narrowed the 
exclusion in army leadership to cases of jih d. Al-ʿAwwā did affirm, however, that the participa-
tion of non-Muslims in the army, government, and representative councils is contingent on their 
non-performance of any act with religious connotation 31 ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwda (1906-1954)32 
and ʿAbd al-Karīm Zaydān 1 1 -2014)33 shared a similar view Huwaydī citing al-Fārūqī
(1921-1986), a co-founder of the International Institute of Islamic Thought argued that non-
Muslims need to be excluded from all positions where decision making is premised on a personal 
commitment to Islam.34 On this issue again we see that the positions do not necessarily descend 
from the theoretical premise on the persistence of the status of protection. 
The turn of most traditional intellectuals to accommodation within the hegemonic discourse 
generated a response in the form of a counter-hegemonic offshoot. Traditional intellectuals who 
carried on with the confrontation that al-Bannā and Mawdūdī had initiated represented quite
 
26  Historically, the termination of the jizya in Egypt by Saʿīd (r. 1854-1863) anticipated the Kha -i Humāyūn of 1856 by over 
almost two years according to a recent study and went hand-in-hand with the conscription of Copts.  The termination of 
the jizya by the Kha -i Humāyūn of 1856 for all the Ottoman provinces was followed by the introduction of an alternative 
conscription tax for those non-Muslims who kept not serving in the army, the badaliyya ʿaskariyya which generated a 
strong backlash against non-Muslims, especially in the Levant. MAḤMŪD AYMAN, al-Ji a f Miṣr 1713-1856, Cairo 2009, at 
185 225. 
27  AL-QARAḌĀWĪ, supra n. 20, at 33. 
28  AL-ʿAWWĀ, supra n. 23, at 75. 
29  SHĀHĪN ʿIMĀD, al-Muw ṭana Mawḍ ʿan li-l-Fikr wa-l-Baḥth. al-Khiṭ b al-Isl m  f  Miṣr, in: Abū Zayd ʿAlā et al. (ed.), al-
Muw ṭana al-Miṣriyya wa-Mustaqbal al-D muqr ṭiyya, Cairo 2005, at 141. 
30  AL-QARAḌĀWĪ, supra n. 20, at 46. 
31  AL-ʿAWWĀ, supra n. 23, at 76. 
32  ʿAwda frames the issue of dhimm s within a broader, apologetic reflection on the concept of equality in Islamic criminal 
legislation. He argues that a consequence of the dhimma is the dhimm s commitment to Islamic law li-anna al-dhimm  wa-
qad iltazam aḥk m al-isl m [..]). ʿAWDA ʿABD AL-QĀDIR, al-Ta h ʿ al-Jin ʾ  al-Isl m Muq anan bi-l-Q n n al-Waḍ , Vol. 1, 
Beirut (s.d.), at 332 333. 
33  In his doctoral thesis defended in 1 62 and published two decades later Zaydān explicitly allows the participation of
dhimm s in presidential and parliamentary elections. ZAYDĀN ʿABD AL-KARĪM, Aḥk m al-Dhimmiyy n wa-l-Mustaʾmin n f  
D r al-Isl m, Baghdad 1982, 83 85.  
34  Iltiz m hakhṣ  bi-l-isl m. Cit. in HUWAYDĪ, supra n. 25, 170 171.  
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a marginal trend, and to their marginalization heavily contributed the efforts of both organic 
intellectuals and traditional intellectuals engaged in the accommodation.  
The idea that political bonds of lesser degree than Islam belong to the Age of Ignorance (al-
J hili a), and need thus to be discarded, was retained as a main feature of two quite different 
trends of thought, the Salafi and Jihadi currents.35 This is particularly clear in the rhetoric of both 
the Salafi Jamāʿa Islāmiyya 36 and the Jihadi Jamāʿat al-Jihād. Refusing the idea of a political 
community defined in national terms, Salafi37 and Jihadi38 thinkers tended then to frame the issue 
of relations with others living on the same territory in terms of al- al ʾ wa-l-bar ʾ (loyalty to fel-
low Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslims).  
On the grounds of al- al ʾ wa-l-bar ʾ discourse this counter-hegemonic offshoot also engaged the 
accommodating (traditional) intellectuals, challenging their accommodation as a form of collab-
oration in the hegemonic project of the ruling class and its organic intellectuals. Al-Ẓawāhirī 
(1951-), for instance, as one of the main ideologues of al-Qāʿida accused the Muslim Brotherhood 
of having committed grave sins and ideological lapses  in accepting the concept of citizenship 
of non-Muslims. It is interesting that al-Ẓawāhirī did not cite in support of his position al-Bannā 
(the originator of this renewal), but rather classics like al-Qur ubī (d. 1273) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
1328).39 
3. The Third Phase: The Counterchallenge 
The third phase of the debate was precipitated in the early 2000s by the counterchallenge of the 
Egyptian regime against its opposition, which was ideologically framed as a challenge by state 
nationalism to political Islam. Citizenship was brought back to the center of the debate by Pres-
ident Mubārak s son Jamāl who mobilized en masse the regime s organic intellectuals against
traditional intellectuals Jamāl Mubārak s political ascent one could even argue was centered
around the revival of the citizenship debate In resorting to citizenship Jamāl pursued three
main goals: reviving Egypt s ruling party ideology with injections from political liberalism
grounding a neoliberal economic vision that would favor his constituency in the private sector, 
and challenging the opposition on what was perceived as a favorably uneven playing field. 
The mobilization of organic intellectuals by Jamāl started at the ruling party level the National
Democratic Party NDP The NDP s poor performance in the 2000 parliamentary elections al
lowed Jamāl to put forward a plan to reform the party Central to the reform plan was the retire-
ment of the last vestiges of state socialism that still lingered in the official rhetoric (and in the 
constitution), and the embracing of political liberalism. Organic intellectuals were rallied under 
the slogan al-Fikr al-Jadīd New Thinking and under this label political liberalism began be
ing injected into the NDP discourse. The party s annual conventions started revolving around
 
35  It is worth mentioning that those within the Egyptian Salafi galaxy that later decided to engage in active politics sidelined 
this line of argument and joined the accommodation bloc. 
36  AL-JAMĀʿA AL-ISLĀMIYYA, M h al-ʿAmal al-I l m , Cairo 1987, at 206. 
37  For a (biased) survey of the positions of Salafism on citizenship, and a (useful) mapping of political articulations of 
Salafism, see, ḤASANAYN TAWFĪQ IBRĀHĪM, al-Salafi n wa-l-Muw ṭana: Iḍṭir b al-Ruʾya wa-Ghiy b al-Mur jiʿ t al-Fiqhiyya, 
Cairo 2013. 
38  AL-ẒAWĀHIRĪ AYMAN, Al-Wal ʾ wa-l-Bar ʾ: ʿAq da Manq la a-W iʿ Mafq d, s.l. 2002. 
39  See the discussion reported in SHĀHĪN, supra n. 29, at 148 149. Al- al ʾ wa-l-bar ʾ is still the horizon of the current debate 
on citizenship within Salafism; see WRIGHT BRIAN, The Legal Methodology of the Salafi Movement in Egypt [MA Thesis at 
American University in Cairo, 2012], at 55 58. 
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these concepts as early as 2002 when Jamāl was appointed to head the Policies Secretariat. The 
2003 annual convention, in particular, worked on a white paper titled al-Fikr al-Jad d wa-Ḥuq q 
al-Muw ṭin (The New Thinking and the Rights of the Citizen). The first point of the white paper 
was the revival (iḥy ʾ) of the concept of citizenship and the renewal (taḥd th) of the structural 
relationship between the citizen (al-muw ṭin) and the state (al-dawla  
The mobilization of organic intellectuals extended far beyond the ruling party; almost all insti-
tutions and associations organized events, workshops or conferences on citizenship in the 2000s. 
Perhaps the best example is the massive, two-volume collection of proceedings of the annual 
meeting of the Center of Political Research and Studies in 2003. Its 1407 pages feature all the most 
prominent Egyptian intellectuals of the time engaging with the concept of citizenship.40 
The counterchallenge eventually generated two cycles of amendments to the 1971 Constitution, 
one in 2005 and one in 2007.41 In the latter amendment cycle, citizenship muw ṭana) even be-
came the rhetorical centerpiece of Egypt s form of state substituting the alliance of the working 
forces of the people as the basis of Egypt s system of government (Article 1).42 The amendment 
to Article 1 was presented as part of a general purging of the socialist terminology, but so were 
other controversial amendments, like the one that entrenched violations of constitutional rights 
under pretext of anti-terrorism (Article 179).43 In the reading of the constitutional amendments 
in the Upper House (Majlis al-Sh ), there was a moment in which a challenge to the hegemonic 
discourse on citizenship was brought by Rifʿat al-Saʿīd, Secretary General of al-Tajammuʿ (an 
opposition party on the left of the political spectrum). Questioning the clarity of what was meant 
by citizenship al-Saʿīd proposed the addition of the following clause: which means full 
equality (m h) among citizens irrespective of gender, religion or social class This sugges
tion which was rejected was made probably to push back on Jamāl s neoliberal approach  
A dignified position of citizenship in the constitution served different items on Jamāl s political 
agenda, including challenging traditional intellectuals. In particular, a strong statement in the 
sense of full formal equality to be enshrined in the constitution in the form of citizenship fit
such an agenda by offering grounds for agitating the spectrum of a discourse of political relations 
based on unequal standing by the Muslim Brotherhood and its base of traditional intellectuals.  
In other amendments of the same cycle, one can also identify this very goal.  A clause was added, 
for instance, to art. 5 prohibiting all political activity within a religious frame of reference 
 
40  ABŪ ZAYD ʿALĀ/RAʾŪF ʿIZZAT HIBA (eds.), al-Muw ṭana al-Miṣriyya wa-Mustaqbal al-D muqr ṭiyya: Ruʾá Jad da li-ʿ lam Mu-
taghayyir, Cairo 2005. 
41  The amendments were actually first presented at the 2006 convention of the NDP by Jamāl Mubārak himself What citi
zenship fully represented in his vision has not been fully identified, but was strongly connected with the idea of economic 
empowerment of the individual in a neoliberal landscape, away from any previous focus on the social and with a view to 
progressively abandon any form of substantial wealth redistribution policies. 
42  The 1 1 formula read that the Arab Republic of Egypt was a state with a socialist democratic system based on the 
alliance of the working forces of the people After the 200 reform the article read a democratic system based on citi
zenship niẓ muh  d muqr ṭ  yaq m ʿalá a s al-muw ṭana). 
43  The 1971 text, which provided for the Socialist Public Prosecutor, was substituted in 2007 with a provision on counter-
terrorism.  The provision allowed state institutions to disregard fundamental rights of suspect terrorists, and gave to the 
President the right to refer any crime of terrorism to any judicial authority The practice of referring civilians to military 
courts thus suddenly became constitutional. 
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(marjiʿiyya d niyya), and was read as an attempt to constrain the Muslim Brotherhood, whose 
candidates had performed really well in the 2005 general elections.44 
Reactions to the massive mobilization of the counterchallenge were rather tepid, both in the cir-
cles of traditional intellectuals, and in the state institutions called to implement the new vision. 
Traditional intellectuals did not significantly alter the positions they had articulated during the 
second phase:45 a number of earlier publications on citizenship were simply reprinted, while no 
major theoretical shift was recorded.  State institutions, for their part, never fully espoused the 
citizenship discourse (signaling a halfhearted embrace of Jamāl s political agenda), which never 
featured even in their official narratives, not even in the decisions of higher courts.  
III. The Hegemonic Consensus 
The hegemonic consensus on the restriction of the debate on citizenship to issues of religious 
(in)equality seemed to crumble in 2011, when the Revolution reopened the discussion on ques-
tions of political participation, class and gender. With the contribution of traditional and organic 
intellectuals, however, the constitution-making process put a lid back on the revolutionary en-
thusiasm  a lid cloaked in citizenship rhetoric.46 After 2011, the constitutional provision enshrin-
ing citizenship was maintained sidelined or otherwise returned to in line with the positions of
the actors (organic or traditional), but still betraying the overarching, hegemonic consensus on 
what citizenship should mean, and thus prevent its use in more progressive discourse. 
In early 2011, Article 1 was reproduced verbatim in the interim Constitution by the military 
junta, but removed from the 2012 Constitution drafted by a Constitutional Assembly in which 
traditional intellectuals were heavily overrepresented because of the electoral success of the 
Brotherhood and al-Nūr Salafis.  Showing some unease with the citizenship rhetoric, traditional 
intellectuals opted for a non-descriptive reference to the democratic system of Article 1 and
expounded on the foundations of such a system in Article 6, which read: the political system is 
based on the principles of democracy and consultation ( h ), citizenship which makes all cit-
izens equal in public rights and duties , political and party pluralism, peaceful transfer of 
power, the separation and balance of powers, the rule of law, the respect of human rights and 
freedoms Citizenship thus became one of the many foundations of the political system, and 
the explanatory clause which makes all citizens equal in public rights and duties was also
introduced to rule out any other possible interpretation beyond the hegemonic understanding 
of citizenship as religious (in)equality in certain areas of the legal system, namely public rights 
and duties. 
After the ousting of Muḥammad Mursī the situation reversed and the 2014 Constitution was 
drafted by a Committee in which organic intellectuals became heavily overrepresented because 
of the direct appointment by the Interim President.  They reverted to the 1971 text as amended 
in 200 just adding to citizenship a reference to the rule of law In its final form Article 1 now 
 
44  HAMZAWY AMR, Political Motivations and Implications, in: Brown Nathan J./Dunne Michele/Hamzawy Amr (eds.), Egypt s 
Controversial Constitutional Amendments, Washington 2007, at 6 7. 
45  A good example of this trend is ʿIMĀRA MUḤAMMAD, Ukdh ba al-Iḍṭih d al-D n  f  Miṣr, Cairo 2000. 
46  On the seizing of the constitutional (Big Bang) moment in Egypt and its consequences see PAROLIN GIANLUCA P., Consti-
tutions Against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (2015), 31
45, at 37 40. 
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reads: the republican, democratic system is based on citizenship (muw ṭana) and the rule of law 
( i dat al-q n n  
The turmoil that followed 2011 could suggest a shift from the hegemonic consensus on citizen-
ship, especially considering the brutality with which both organic and traditional intellectuals 
seemed to be at each other s throat Surprisingly however the recent contribution of one of the 
most prominent contemporary intellectuals appears.to suggest otherwise, as we will explore in 
the following section 
IV. Grounding the Hegemonic Consensus in Islamicate 
Discourse: Ṭāriq al-Bishr  
As the hegemonic consensus on citizenship was being sealed and entrenched in constitutional 
documents, how did traditional intellectuals (re)articulate their positions?  In this last section of 
the article, I zoom in on a recent contribution that illustrates the quest by a prominent traditional 
intellectual, Ṭāriq al-Bishrī 1 33-), for a framework for the hegemonic consensus on citizenship 
that is both coherent and grounded in Islamicate discourse.  I will closely follow the unfolding 
of his thought as it offers in illuminating insight into how the goal of hegemonic consensus seems 
to guide and constrain the intellectual inquiry. 
Ṭāriq al-Bishrī 1 33-) is a Cairo University graduate who spent his entire professional life in 
Egypt s Council of State He has participated in the citizenship debate for over three decades 
and injected into it his ample knowledge of the contemporary Egyptian legal system.  He is 
counted among the traditional intellectuals because of his desire to ground his positions in Is-
lamicate discourse. 
Al-Bishrī started considering the issue of citizenship as early as 1980 in his al-M lim n a-l-
A b ṭ f  Iṭ r al-Jam ʿa al-Waṭaniyya (Muslims and Copts in the Framework of the National Com-
munity).47 He has continued thinking about the issue since then, has extensively published on 
the subject, and has recently pushed his analysis to a further level of maturity in a short essay 
entitled al-Jamāʿa al-Wa aniyya fī Ḍawʾ Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya  (The National Com-
munity in the Light of the Objectives of Islamic Law), published in 2014.48 It is in this last work 
al-Jamāʿa al-Wa aniyya ) that we will follow the unfolding of al-Bishrī s thought and his search 
for a framework for the hegemonic consensus. 
In al-Jamāʿa al-Wa aniyya  (2014), al-Bishrī opens his contribution by situating his analysis
within the maq ṣid stream a renewal stream that emphasizes a teleological reading of the law 
by focusing on the maq ṣid al- ha ʿa (lit. aims or purposes of the law) , and warning the reader 
of the dangers of not considering political concepts like the national community within the
historical practices that lend these concepts their intellectual significance.49 After tracing an Ar-
istotelian account of the historical development of the national community as a political commu-
 
47  Itself republished in 2004 by al-Shurūq  
48  AL-BISHRĪ ṬĀRIQ, al-Jam ʿa al-Waṭaniyya f  Ḍawʾ Maq ṣid al-Shar ʿa al-Isl mi a, in: al-ʿAwwā Muḥammad Salīm (ed.), Tafʿ l 
Maq ṣid al-Shar ʿa f l-Maj l al-Si Majm ʿat Buḥ th, London 2014, 115 58. 
49  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 117. 
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nity embracing a variety of forms of affiliation and sub-units, al-Bishrī moves to define citizen
ship in rather conventional ways as the status (ṣifa) of the individual who belongs to a certain 
political community as defined by the state .50 
Al-Bishrī then sifts Islam s texts and traditions for indicators of maq ṣid on human communities.  
As a result, he identifies in the Ṣaḥīfa the political arrangements of Yathrib after the hijra (also 
known as the Constitution of Medina) and recorded in Ibn Isḥāq s S a a foundational moment 
in the establishment of a political community beyond the previous forms of affiliation.51 Al-Bishrī
argues that even an historical event can be a source of maq ṣid, especially if it captures a funda-
mental transformation such as the establishment of the first Islamic community in its political 
form in Medina.52 In reading the Ṣaḥīfa, al-Bishrī stresses how it encompassed lower units (like 
kin groups) into a larger community53 without displacing the former and their forms of affilia-
tion.54 And citing wa-inna al-muʾmin na baʿḍuhum maw l  baʿḍin d n al-n he concludes that the
higher form of affiliation was the bond of faith or Islam which is the foundation of what would 
be today called the political community and citizenship 55 In al-Bishrī s reading this commu
nity the first state (dawla) that Islam has known transcended older affiliations without oblite-
rating them, embraced non-Muslims on an equal footing whilst being founded on a dogmatic 
religious basis, established the principle of equality and solidarity in view of the common pro-
tection against the enemy, and was also the first state (dawla) that Islam has known.56 
When considering the Islamic political community later scholars argues al-Bishrī were con-
sumed with a concern for unity.  He takes al-Aḥk m al-Sulṭ niyya wa-l-Wil y t al-D ni a by al-
Māwardī d 105 as an example of this concern for unity. Unity was, however, reconsidered 
after the abolishment of the Caliphate in the 1920s, and al-Bishrī cites three authors justifying
pluralism (taʿaddud within the political community Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935),57 Muṣ afá Ṣabrī 
(1869-1954),58 and ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī 1 5-1971).59 Political Islam on the other hand, 
concedes al-Bishrī did resist the idea of pluralism within the political community the positions
of Mawdūdī, al-Bannā al-Ghazālī or al-Qaraḍāwī can be explained within the context of their 
resistance to the threat of nationalism. While these latter authors did indeed challenge pluralism 
as a proxy of nationalism, what they were really aiming at was Islamic rule (an ak n al-ḥukm 
isl miyyan). Al-Bishrī summarizes it as a need for 1 the reference marjiʿiyya) of the various po-
litical systems and (2) the parameters (muʿ mal t) that rule the community to be Islamic.  Beyond 
 
50  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 120. 
51  The Ṣaḥīfa plays an important role also in the view of many other scholars trying to define citizenship within an Islamic 
frame of reference. See the ones cited in SHĀHĪN, supra n. 29, at 136. 
52  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 123. 
53  And with their kins and communities they became one nation (umma) that is: one community (jam ʿa); and from the 
multiplicity of communitarian affiliations they became a community with one affiliation (Fa-hum bi-aqw mihim a-jam ʿ ti-
him al-mutaʿaddida ṣ r  ummatan a jam ʿa, wa-hum maʿa taʿaddud intim ʾ tihim al-jam ʿiyya ṣ r  jam ʿatan dha in im ʾ 
w ḥid AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 123. 
54  Citing the section where the Ṣaḥīfa establishes that the Quraysh who left Mecca are responsible for each other as a group 
(ʿalá rabʿatihim yataʿ qal n baynahum AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 123. 
55  (Believers protect each other against the enemy), AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 124. 
56  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 124 125. 
57  RIḌĀ RASHĪD, al-Khil fa a al-Im ma al-ʿUẓmá, Cairo 1923, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 126 127. 
58  ṢABRĪ MUṢṬAFÁ, al-Nak ʿalá Munkar  al-Niʿma min al-D n wa-l-Khil fa a-l-Umma, Beirut 1924, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, 
at 127 128. 
59  AL-SANHŪRĪ ʿABD AL-RAZZĀQ, Le Califat, son évolution vers une Société des Nations Orientales, Paris 1926, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, 
supra n. 48, at 128 129. 
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Islamic rule, all other issues -- whether unity or pluralism within the community itself, the sys-
tem of citizenship, or even state sovereignty (ḥ kimiyya)  are open to discussion and conceptu-
alized in the Islamic perspective within historical dynamics.60 
Moving into the definition of citizenship in Islam, al-Bishrī claims that the equality element at its 
core is firmly established in Islam s texts and tradition even if historical circumstances or polit
ical considerations might have, at times, steered the relations between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims in other directions.61 Beyond citizenship s core of equality however remain controversial
issues like the access of non-Muslims to positions of public authority (al- il al-ʿ mma); al-
Bishrī is keen to discuss this point but before doing so warns against the decontextualized use 
of legal opinions (fatwas). He does this by wittily referring to a scholar whose opinions are the 
most cited in discussions on the status of non-Muslims often without proper contextualization: 
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350).62 
In analyzing the concept of il a, al-Bishrī looks first at the Qur anic verses that are invoked in
support of its limitation to Muslims alone (Q. 3:28, 5:51, 5:57, 4:144, 4:138-9, 60:9, 60:1).  He relies 
on the tafs  literature of modern scholars like ʿ Abduh, Riḍā, and Qu b, but also that of traditional 
scholars like al-Qur ubī (d. 1273) and Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373). While challenging the scope of the 
verses, al-Bishrī reaffirms the point that resorting to the context of revelation a b b al-n l) is 
not a way to historically bracket the revelation, but rather to identify the circumstances 
(m n ab ) that allow the scholar to apply the same ruling (ḥukm) to comparable situations.63 
When it comes to the meaning of il a, al-Bishrī briefly points to its semantic richness and then 
parses its use by traditional scholars like Ibn al-Qayyim.  He dissects the episodes that the latter 
cites to justify the prohibition of employing Jews in any matter related to it or other affairs of 
Muslims (f ha ʾ min wil y t al-muslim n wa-um ihim).64 Just as with the controversial interpre-
tations of the Qur anic verses al-Bishrī points to the particular context of both the prophetic
episode in the wake of the Battle of Badr, and the caliphal practice of ʿUmar employed by Ibn al-
Qayyim. He then challenges the depiction of historical events as law (fiqh) without engaging 
with the proper fiqh methodology. 
After sketching the main positions in the current debate, al-Bishrī concludes that the principle of
equality as expressed in the maxim their rights are our rights their duties are our duties 65 is 
not questioned; what requires further fiqh engagement in the spirit of citizenship is the issue 
of the right to take up key state posts and leading policy functions, be it in the judiciary, the army 
or the public administration, or elsewhere what traditional scholars used to refer to as the 
il ʿamma 66 
 
60  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 131 132. 
61  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 134 137. 
62  IBN AL-QAYYIM, Iʿl m al-Muwaqqiʿ n ʿan Rabb al-ʿAlam n, Beirut 1991, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 137 139. 
63  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 140 142. 
64  IBN AL-QAYYIM, Aḥk m Ahl al-Dhimma, Vol. 1, Dammam 1997, at 450, cit. in AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 146. 
65  Lah m m lan a-ʿalayhim m  ʿalayn . In the wider debate, this expression is actually widely challenged as to its origin and 
authenticity. 
66  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 153. 
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In order to address the question of the il ʿāmma, al-Bishrī claims that the contemporary
political community emerged with decolonization, and is therefore founded on the common re-
sistance of Muslims and non-Muslims against the colonizer it is this point which frames his 
post-colonial view on citizenship.67 
When it comes to the il at ʿāmma of the imam, al-Bishrī posits that in traditional fiqh the ex
tension of the imam s jurisdiction was tremendous and that both decision making and policy
implementation depended on the individual will of the imam alone Even the delegated minis
ter a r al-tafw ḍ) in al-Māwardī s design had powers that not even the President the Prime
Minister or the entire Government would have in a contemporary system. Both posts, according 
to al-Māwardī were open to Muslims alone  
Al-Bishrī thus contends that in contemporary constitutional design there is neither the same tra-
ditional concentration of powers, nor is any individual allowed to decide or act alone as the 
imam (or as even the a r al-tafw ḍ) used to in al-Māwardī s design. This holds true maintains 
al-Bishrī even in the administrative apparatus, where the work is divided among various indi-
viduals (and bodies) according to technical specialization. 
From al-Bishrī s perspective even if one such post with the same breadth of jurisdiction, indi-
vidual decision making, and policy implementation as the imam or a r al-tafw ḍ were to exist, 
it would be limited in its operation by the constitution (and ordinary, and secondary legislation). 
Constitution making or legislating themselves are not in the hands of an individual, but are ra-
ther found in bodies where various individuals participate in the deliberation.   
In al-Bishrī s view the traditional autocratic powers of the imam are not found in contemporary
constitutional systems, because these very powers are divided among many bodies and institu-
tions, and the main political deliberations are left to communal instead of individual decision 
making.68 If bodies replaced individuals (imams and wuzar ʾ mufawwaḍ n) in the discharge of 
public functions ( a all al- il al-ʿāmma), al-Bishri argues that the individual requirement of 
adhering to Islam needs to be transferred onto the body. The body does not have a religion, but 
can have a marjiʿiyya, which he defines as the intellectual foundation to which the body resorts 
to when acting and the extent of its legitimacy over the people.69 If the body has an Islamic 
marjiʿiyya (reference), then. claims al-Bishrī its authority il a) is Islamic according to law 
(fiqh). 
Since the 1923 Constitution, the provision that Islam is the religion of the state was introduced 
on the suggestion of the mufti emeritus al-Mu īʿī, and has been maintained ever since.70 Such a 
provision in al-Bishrī s reading marks the authority of the state as Islamic and thus allows all 
citizens Muslims and non-Muslims alike to fully participate in decision making and policy 
implementation on an equal footing.  This resolves for him the issue of access of non-Muslims to 
key state posts and leading policy functions. 
 
67  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 154. 
68  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 156. 
69  Al-aṣl al-fikr  al-marj ʿ ilayh f m  yuṣdar ʿanh min na h ṭ wa-madá iltiz mih  bi-h dh  al-aṣl bi-ḥusb nih mawridan li-sharʿiyyat 
wil a ih ʿalá al-n s. AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 157. 
70  With the notable exception of the 1958 Constitution. 
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In addition to the effect of the Islamic reference on the grounding of the citizenship principle, 
the interaction between Article 2 (declaring Islam the religion of the state) and Article 1 (declar-
ing the centrality of citizenship in the political system) signals to al-Bishrī that the constitution
identifies as its marjiʿiyya not just any of the various possible Islamic readings, but the one em-
bracing equality among citizens.  It is an operation which, in al-Bishrī s view is a form of pref
erence ( a j ḥ) well-established in traditional scholarship as one of the prerogatives of the (polit-
ical or judicial) authority ( al al-amr).71 
Al-Bishrī s arguments in al-Jamāʿa al-Wa aniyya  (2014) raise more questions than they answer.  
But they speak to the driving desire to ground in Islamicate discourse a reconciled reading of 
citizenship that can meet organic intellectuals half way: we accept the participation of non-
Muslims as long as Islam is established By doing so traditional intellectuals confirm their po
sitioning and seal the hegemonic consensus on the restriction of the debate on citizenship to 
issues of religious (in)equality. 
V. Conclusion 
Citizenship offers a good vantage point to observe how cultural hegemony has been constructed 
in Egypt since the 1920s. Citizenship is however just one instance of how non-coercive forms of 
domination were articulated, and they stretched far beyond citizenship onto the structures of the 
post-colonial state and its governance system. 
The article focused on the positions of traditional intellectuals in order to shed light on their 
contribution to the construction of cultural hegemony, while the ruling class and its organic in-
tellectuals were heavily engaged with structuring the nationalist project.  The three phases of the 
debate allow us to appreciate how the positions shifted over time, but these shifts should not 
distract us from the consolidation of consensus over what citizenship meant a consensus that 
was taking shape in the background. 
In the first phase (the counter-hegemonic inception phase), the debate started as a counter-heg-
emonic challenge by traditional intellectuals to organic intellectuals and their nationalist ideolo-
gies (over the century both the local waṭaniyya and the wider qawmiyya). The challenge was 
brought by traditional intellectuals on citizenship, because it was perceived as a playing field 
that was unfavorable to organic intellectuals equality irrespective of religious affiliation or
citizenship (muw ṭana). The traditional intellectuals must have thought that it was an element of 
the nationalist project that could not fly with the wider Egyptian public, and counted on wide-
spread consensus against such a principle When this challenge did not work traditional intel
lectuals experimented with forms of accommodation until it was the organic intellectuals who, 
spearheaded by the ruling party, decided in the third phase to re-engage traditional intellectuals 
on the same playing field. Beginning in the accommodation phase and continuing through the 
counter-challenge third phase, the, contention between traditional and organic intellectuals 
seems to fade, giving way to an overarching consensus on the post-colonial state and its struc-
tures of governance. 
 
71  AL-BISHRĪ, supra n. 48, at 158. 
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In the counter-challenge phase, revamping the contention with traditional intellectuals was at 
the heart of the political project of President Mubārak s son Jamāl who mobilized organic intel
lectuals.  The counter-challenge which suffered from the personal political successes and de-
feats of Jamāl Mubārak did not affect the core of the hegemonic consensus over what citizen-
ship means (in Egypt). Al-Bishrī s contribution confirms that the hegemonic consensus even
went through the 2011 uprising and the 2013 coup unscathed, and seals such consensus ex parte 
traditional intellectuals by grounding it in Islamicate discourse. 
At the heart of the hegemonic consensus is thus a discourse that fully occupies the public debate 
on citizenship with issues of religious (in)equality, and thus prevents any meaningful engage-
ment with other key components of citizenship, like political participation, gender equality or 
class mobility.  Both traditional and organic intellectuals contributed to the emergence and per-
petuation of this hegemonic consensus, with traditional intellectuals showing a remarkable abil-
ity to work within Islam s texts and traditions to dress it in proper Islamic garments 72 
The partaking of traditional intellectuals in the construction of the hegemonic consensus con-
strains at once their ability to engage with both religious (in)equality, and wider citizenship is-
sues in Islam s texts and traditions On religious in equality for instance the status of non-
Muslim citizens not belonging to the canonical category of People of the Book is left hanging, or 
is at best discussed on the margins.   Beyond the conventional equality core, traditional intel-
lectuals constrain themselves not to explore and engage with other wider aspects of citizenship,73 
like the scope for participation in decision making for the Muslim citizen in the overall govern-
ance structure, how to address gender disparities, or rethink rigidities in class mobility.  Even if 
traditional intellectuals think they are providing a counter-hegemonic discourse (as it might 
have been the case in the first phase), they are really participating in the construction of a hege-
monic consensus that holds down even their potentials. 
 
72  Part of the conventional reading of citizenship in the religious discourse is to articulate the discussions in terms of rights 
and duties (al-ḥuq a-l-il i m ). SHĀHĪN, supra n. 29, at 134. 
73  SHĀHĪN, supra n. 29, at 132. 
